UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-cv-3301-RGS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
CITY OF CAMBRIDGE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
AUBREY DRAKE GRAHAM, a/k/a DRAKE,
OVO SOUND, and
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
OF DISMISSAL (All Plaintiffs)
vs.
POSTFUNK PSYCHEDELIC

January 16, 2021
DIAZ, E.J.

Pro se plaintiff Aubrey Drake Graham a/k/a Drake's Complaint arises from a
dispute with defendant Postfunk Psychedelic, over several accounts of
"mischievous behavior" at the plaintiff's, as stated, "covert" five-bedroom apartment
in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The Complaint chronicles, albeit in confusing detail,
the escalation of the defendant's activities towards the plaintiff, which are as
follows: theft of personal belongings, blocking the entrance to the plaintiff's
apartment with garbage containers, installing unregulated modifications to the
plaintiff's vehicle, breaking and entering into the plaintiff's apartment and placing
hair extension accessories in various places while the plaintiff is not at home or
asleep. Per plaintiff's statement, there may have been more accounts of the
defendant tampering with his personal belongings, however no tangible evidence
of such activities have been found. The Complaint culminates with the accusation
that defendant Postfunk Psychedelic “willfully commissioned an interstate/intrastate
extortion scheme” targeted at Graham. Compl. ¶ 13. The remaining plaintiffs –
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General of the Commonwealth,
and the City of Cambridge Police Department – have been derelict in their duties to
investigate and prosecute the extortionist.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . which is not to be
expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(h)(3). Although Psychedelic asserts federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §1331, the Complaint is bereft of any plausibly pled federal claim.
Within the body of the Complaint, Psychedelic cites to two federal statutes.
See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 32 and 34. However, neither is germane.
1 On January 16, 2021, Graham filed a
Stipulation of Dismissal with prejudice.
* * * 1 * * *
In the first instance, Graham seeks relief under a federal criminal
statute, 18 U.S.C. §875, which typical of criminal statutes, provides for no
private right of action.2 See Clements v. Miller, 2005 WL 2085497, at *4 (D.
Colo. Aug. 29, 2005), aff'd sub nom. Clements v. Chapman, 189 F. App’x 688
(10th Cir. 2006) (citing Weiss v. Sawyer, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1227 (W.D.
Okla.1997)). “Unless a federal statute bestows a private right of action,
courts ought to presume that Congress did not intend to confer federal
jurisdiction.” PCS 2000 LP v. Romulus Telecomm., Inc., 148 F.3d 32, 35 (1st
Cir. 1998). In a second essay at establishing jurisdiction, Graham prays for
the “remedies authorized by . . . 18 U.S.C. §1961,” the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). To establish a RICO
violation (criminal or civil), a plaintiff must show “(1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Sedina, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985); see also Efron v. Embassy Suites
(Puerto Rico), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2000). Unfortunately,
Graham’s Complaint lends itself to no plausible reading that suggests
2 18 U.S.C. § 875(d), criminalizes those who “with intent to extort . . .
transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing
any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another
or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee
or any other person of a crime.”
* * * 2 * * *
“racketeering activity,” an “association in fact” of any or all of these
defendants, or the commission of two or more related “predicate acts” posing
a threat of continuing criminal activity. Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503
U.S. 258, 268 n.12 (1992) (The predicate acts must be the proximate cause
of plaintiff’s injury); see also Efron, 223 F.3d at 14.
Finally, Graham asks the court to order the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Massachusetts Attorney General, and the Cambridge
Police Department to “show cause” why they have allegedly failed to
investigate and prosecute the alleged extortionist. Compl. ¶ 33. This court
cannot grant the requested relief as Graham “lacks standing to contest the
policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted
nor threatened with prosecution.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
619 (1973). Put another way, “in American jurisprudence at least, a private
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another.” Id. More fundamentally, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, prosecutorial discretion is vested exclusively in the
executive branch, and, as stated in the forerunner to the U.S. Constitution,
the judicial department “shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not
of men.” Art. 30, Massachusetts Decl. of Rights.
* * * 3 * * *
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, this action is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as there are no cognizable
federal claims.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Edward Diaz
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE