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They should make it so that if he tries to unhook himself, he has a 41% chance to die instantly.

In December 1964, ARVN forces suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Bình Giã,[142] in a battle both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously, the VC had utilized hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. At Binh Gia, however, they defeated a strong ARVN force in a conventional battle and remained in the field for four days.[143]: 58  Tellingly, South Vietnamese forces were again defeated in June 1965 at the Battle of Đồng Xoài.[143]: 94 

American ground war
See also: Buddhist Uprising

On 8 March 1965, 3,500 U.S. Marines were landed near Da Nang, South Vietnam.[25]: 246–247  This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.[144] The Marines' initial assignment was defense of Da Nang Air Base. The first deployment was increased to nearly 200,000 by December.[76]: 349–351  U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.[76]: 349–351 

General William Westmoreland informed Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp Jr., commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical,[76]: 349–351  "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF (Viet Cong)".[145] With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended.[76]: 353  Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win the war:

Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. and allied forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down and driven back from major populated areas.
Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of 12–18 months following Phase 2 would be required for final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas.[146]

The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the insistence that South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the VC. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.[147] Johnson did not communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity.[148] The change in policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and VC in a contest of attrition and morale. The opponents were locked in a cycle of escalation.[76]: 353–354  Westmoreland and McNamara touted the body count system for gauging victory, a metric that would prove flawed.[149]

The American buildup transformed the South Vietnamese economy and had a profound effect on society. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops; Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines[88]: 556  agreed to do so. South Korea would ask to join the Many Flags program in return for economic compensation. Major allies, however, notably NATO countries Canada and the UK, declined troop requests.[150]

The U.S. and its allies mounted complex search and destroy operations. In November 1965, the U.S. engaged in its first major battle with the PAVN, the Battle of Ia Drang.[151] The operation was the first large scale helicopter air assault by the U.S., and first to employ Boeing B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers in support.[25]: 284–285  These tactics continued in 1966–67, however, the PAVN/VC insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated tactical flexibility. By 1967, the war had generated large-scale internal refugees, 2 million in South Vietnam, with 125,000 people evacuated and rendered homeless during Operation Masher alone,[152] which was the largest search and destroy operation to that point. Operation Masher would have negligible impact, however, as the PAVN/VC returned to the province just four months after it ended.[153]: 153–156  Despite major operations, which the VC and PAVN would typically evade, the war was characterized by smaller-unit contacts or engagements.[154] The VC and PAVN would initiate 90% of large firefights, and thus the PAVN/VC would retain strategic initiative despite overwhelming US force and fire-power deployment.[154] The PAVN and Viet Cong had developed strategies capable of countering US military doctrines and tactics: see NLF and PAVN battle tactics.

Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize with the arrival of prime minister Air Marshal Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and figurehead chief of state, General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, in mid-1965 at the head of a junta. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, after rigged elections. Although they were nominally a civilian government, Kỳ was supposed to maintain real power through a behind-the-scenes military body. However, Thiệu outmanoeuvred and sidelined Kỳ. Thiệu was accused of murdering Kỳ loyalists through contrived military accidents. Thiệu remained president until 1975, having won a one-candidate election in 1971.[88]: 706 

Johnson employed a "policy of minimum candor"[88]: 18  with the media. Military information officers sought to manage coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress. This policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As coverage of the war and the Pentagon diverged, a so-called credibility gap developed.[88]: 18  Despite Johnson and Westmoreland publicly proclaiming victory and Westmoreland stating the "end is coming into view",[155] internal reports in the Pentagon Papers indicate that VC forces retained strategic initiative and controlled their losses. VC attacks against static US positions accounted for 30% of engagements, VC/PAVN ambushes and encirclements for 23%, American ambushes against VC/PAVN forces for 9%, and American forces attacking Viet Cong emplacements only 5%.[154]

Tet Offensive and its aftermath
Main articles: Tet Offensive and United States news media and the Vietnam War

In late 1967, the PAVN lured American forces into the hinterlands at Đắk Tô and at the Marine Khe Sanh combat base, where the U.S. fought The Hill Fights. These were part of a diversionary strategy meant to draw US forces towards the Central Highlands.[156] Preparations were underway for the Tet Offensive, with the intention of Văn Tiến Dũng forces to launch "direct attacks on the American and puppet nerve centers—Saigon, Huế, Danang, all the cities, towns and main bases ..."[157] Le Duan sought to placate critics of the stalemate by planning a decisive victory.[158]: 90–94  He reasoned this could be achieved through sparking an uprising within the towns and cities,[158]: 148  along with mass defections among ARVN units, who were on leave during the truce period.[159]

Following the coup, chaos ensued. Hanoi took advantage and increased its support for the VC. South Vietnam entered extreme political instability, as one military government toppled another in quick succession. Increasingly, each new regime was viewed by the communists as a puppet of the Americans; whatever the failings of Diệm, his credentials as a nationalist had been impeccable.[76]: 328  US advisors were embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces. They were however criticized for ignoring the political nature of the insurgency.[121] The Kennedy administration sought to refocus US efforts on pacification – which in this case was defined as countering the growing threat of insurgency[122][123] – and "winning the hearts and minds" of the population. Military leadership in Washington, however, was hostile to any role for U.S. advisors other than troop training.[124] General Paul Harkins, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, confidently predicted victory by Christmas 1963.[79]: 103  The CIA was less optimistic, however, warning that "the Viet Cong by and large retain de facto control of much of the countryside and have steadily increased the overall intensity of the effort".[125]

Paramilitary officers from the CIA's Special Activities Division trained and led Hmong tribesmen in Laos and into Vietnam. The indigenous forces were in the tens of thousands and conducted direct action missions, led by paramilitary officers, against the Communist Pathet Lao forces and their North Vietnamese supporters.[126] The CIA ran the Phoenix Program and participated in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group (MAC-V SOG).[127]

Gulf of Tonkin and Johnson's escalation, 1963–1969
Main article: Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–1969
Further information: United States in the Vietnam War § Americanization, January 1964 South Vietnamese coup, September 1964 South Vietnamese coup attempt, December 1964 South Vietnamese coup, and 1965 South Vietnamese coup

Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson had not been heavily involved with policy toward Vietnam;[128][A 9] however, upon becoming president, he immediately focused it. On 24 November 1963, he said, "the battle against communism ... must be joined ... with strength and determination."[130] Johnson knew he had inherited a deteriorating situation in South Vietnam,[131] but adhered to the widely accepted domino argument for defending the South: Should they retreat or appease, either action would imperil other nations.[132] Findings from RAND's Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project bolstered his confidence that an air war would weaken the insurgency. Some argue the policy of North Vietnam was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia.[76]: 48 

The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, had 12 members. It was headed by General Dương Văn Minh, whom journalist Stanley Karnow, recalled as "a model of lethargy".[88]: 340  Lodge cabled home about Minh: "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?" Minh's regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General Nguyễn Khánh.[88]: 341  There was persistent instability in the military: several coups—not all successful—occurred in a short period of time.

Gulf of Tonkin incident
Main article: Gulf of Tonkin incident
Further information: Credibility gap

On 2 August 1964, USS Maddox, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, fired upon and damaged torpedo boats approaching it in the Gulf of Tonkin.[57]: 124  A second attack was reported two days later on USS Turner Joy and Maddox. The circumstances were murky.[25]: 218–219  Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish."[133] An NSA publication declassified in 2005 revealed there was no attack on 4 August.[134]

The second "attack" led to retaliatory airstrikes, and prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 7 August 1964.[135]: 78  The resolution granted the president power "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" and Johnson relied on this as giving him authority to expand the war.[25]: 221  Johnson pledged he was not "committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land".[25]: 227 

The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Following an attack on a U.S. Army base on 7 February 1965,[136] airstrikes were initiated, while Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was on a state visit to North Vietnam. Operation Rolling Thunder and Operation Arc Light expanded aerial bombardment and ground support operations.[137] The bombing campaign, which lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the VC by threatening to destroy North Vietnamese air defenses and infrastructure. It was additionally aimed at bolstering South Vietnamese morale.[138] Between March 1965 and November 1968, Rolling Thunder deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.[88]: 468 

Bombing of Laos
Main article: Laotian Civil War

Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, targeted different parts of the VC and PAVN infrastructure. These included the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia. The ostensibly neutral Laos had become the scene of a civil war, pitting the Laotian government backed by the US, against the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies.

Massive aerial bombardment against the Pathet Lao and PAVN forces was carried out by the US to prevent the collapse of the Royal central government, and deny use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Between 1964 and 1973, the U.S. dropped two million tons of bombs on Laos, nearly equal to the 2.1 million tons of bombs it dropped on Europe and Asia during World War II, making Laos the most heavily bombed country in history, relative to its population.[139]

The objective of stopping North Vietnam and the VC was never reached. The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis LeMay, however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the communists that "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".[25]: 328 

The 1964 offensive

Following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Hanoi anticipated the arrival of US troops and began expanding the VC, as well as sending increasing numbers of PAVN personnel southwards. They were outfitting the VC forces and standardizing their equipment with AK-47 rifles and other supplies, as well as forming the 9th Division.[25]: 223 [140] "From a strength of approximately 5,000 at the start of 1959 the Viet Cong's ranks grew to about 100,000 at the end of 1964 ... Between 1961 and 1964 the Army's strength rose from about 850,000 to nearly a million men."[121] U.S. troop numbers deployed to Vietnam during the same period were much lower: 2,000 in 1961, rising to 16,500 in 1964.[141] The use of captured equipment decreased, while greater numbers of ammunition and supplies were required to maintain regular units. Group 559 was tasked with expanding the Ho Chi Minh Trail, in light of the bombardment by US warplanes. The war had shifted into the final, conventional phase of Hanoi's three-stage protracted warfare model. The VC was now tasked with destroying the ARVN and capturing and holding areas; however, it was not yet strong enough to assault major towns and cities.

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The kittens told me to do it

I think Sam Armstrong is pretty cool

I have removed the game from my computer as its content doesn't reflect my values anymore.

Don't mind me just getting the steam award badge using my favourite game of all times

I keep launching this game, playing it for 30 minutes to an hour, then closing it out of boredom. In early game the guns felt amazing and that's pretty much all the game had to offer for me because after a while all the guns become some weird laser space ♥♥♥♥. The whole thing is just cringe. The vast majority of characters have no charisma whatsoever, especially the antagonists. It's like they did the complete opposite of Handsome Jack. The story is just so boring and you just get sent to places that are huge but empty and pointless and just one shot everything and get one shot by everything. Like it was kind of the case with BL2 but in BL3, for some reason, there are so many instances of me being put into the dying state after I'm done killing all the enemies. Like I still don't understand why, is it because a projectile gets launched at me after I killed the last guy ? I don't even know. I'm getting tired even from typing this review and thinking about the game.

Graphics : It looks nice but a lot of stuff is poorly designed, including the characters. There are only a very few places where I could enjoy the landscape but not even enough to make me stop like in previous games. The rest of the time I just look at ♥♥♥♥ and think "Man that's so much empty space to walk/drive through."

Sound : Some ambient tracks are very impactful, I must say. The rest is completely forgettable.

Story : No.

Gameplay : Like I said you one shot everything and get one shot by everything. Bosses included. I don't understand why people seemed to like that kind of stuff so much in BL2 already. I preferred BL1 where everyone wasn't overpowered and you could just walk through stuff and think about what weapons to use and not jump around like a Call of Duty player while holding left click.

And don't get me started on the bugs. Dialogues are turbo ♥♥♥♥♥♥ and keep getting cut. Some lines will randomly repeat, and if you accept one of the DLC quests your character will repeat the same line everytime you spawn, respawn or change area until you start that DLC or something.

TLDR: It feels like a knockoff Borderlands, they didn't do anything right. Shooting bandits never felt this boring. I don't think I'm even going to finish this game because there's nothing that drives me to do that, it just became a chore at this point. I don't even care to know what happens next in the story and how it ends. ♥♥♥♥ you, Borderlands 3.