THE
DISCOVERY
OF A
WORLD
IN THE
MOONE.
OR,
A DISCOVRSE
Tending
TO PROVE
that ’tis probable there
may be another habitable
World in that Planet.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Quid tibi inquis ista proderunt?
Si nihil aliud, hoc certè, sciam
omnia angusta esse. Seneca.
Præf. ad 1. Lib. N. Q.

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Perlegi hæc παράδοξα
& novitatis graciâ
typis mandari
permitto.

Mart. 29. 1638.
Tho. Weekes R.P.
Episc. Lond. Cap.
Domest.

*****************************************
To the Reader.
IF amongst thy leisure houres thou canst spare any for the perusall of this discourse, and dost looke to finde somewhat in it which may serve for thy information and benefit: let me then advise thee to come unto it with an equall minde, not swayed by prejudice, but indifferently resolved to assent unto that truth which upon deliberation shall seeme most probable unto thy reason, and then I doubt not, but either thou wilt agree with mee in this assertion, or at least not thinke it to be as farre from truth, as it is from common opinion.

Two cautions there are which I would willingly admonish thee of in the beginning.

||1. That thou shouldst not here looke to find any exact, accurate Treatise, since this discourse was but the fruit of some lighter studies, and those too hudled up in a short time, being first thought of and finished in the space of some few weekes, and therefore you cannot in reason expect, that it should be so polished, as perhaps, the subject would require, or the leisure of the Author might have done it.

2. To remember that I promise onely probable arguments for the proofe of this opinion, and therefore you must not looke that every consequence should be of an undeniable dependance, or that the truth of each argument should be measured by its necessity. I grant that some Astronomicall appearances may possibly be solved otherwise then here they are. But the thing I aime at is this, that probably they may so be solved, as I have here set them downe: Which, if it be granted (as I thinke it must) then I || doubt not, but the indifferent reader will find some satisfaction in the maine thing that is to be proved.

Many ancient Philosophers of the better note, have formerly defended this assertion, which I have here laid downe, and it were to be wished, that some of us would more apply our endeavours unto the examination of these old opinions, which though they have for a long time lien neglected by others, yet in them may you finde many truths well worthy your paines and observation. Tis a false conceit, for us to thinke, that amongst the ancient variety and search of opinions, the best hath still prevailed. Time (saith the learned Verulam) seemes to be of the nature of a river or streame, which carrieth downe to us that which is light, or blowne up, but sinketh that which is weighty and solid.

It is my desire that by the occasion of this discourse, I may raise up some more active spirit to a search || after other hidden and unknowne truthes. Since it must needes be a great impediment unto the growth of sciences, for men still so to plod on upon beaten principles, as to be afraid of entertaining any thing that may seeme to contradict them. An unwillingnesse to take such things into examination, is one of those errours of learning in these times observed by the judicious Verulam. Questionlesse there are many secret truths, which the ancients have passed over, that are yet left to make some of our age famous for their discovery.

If by this occasion I may provoke any reader to an attempt of this nature, I shall then thinke my selfe happy, and this work successefull.

Farewell.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The First Proposition, by
way of Preface.
That the strangenesse of this opinion is no sufficient reason why it should be rejected, because other certaine truths have beene formerly esteemed ridiculous, and great absurdities entertayned by common consent.

THere is an earnestnesse and hungering after novelty, which doth still adhere unto all our natures, and it is part of that primative image, that wide extent and infinite capacity at first created in the heart of man, for this since its depravation in 2Adam perceiving it selfe altogether emptied of any good doth now catch after every new thing, conceiving that possibly it may finde satisfaction among some of its fellow creatures. But our enemy the divell (who strives still to pervert our gifts, and beate us with our owne weapons) hath so contriv’d it, that any truth doth now seeme distastefull for that very reason, for which errour is entertain’d—Novelty, for let but some upstart heresie be set abroach, and presently there are some out of a curious humour; others, as if they watched an occasion of singularity, will take it up for canonicall, and make it part of their creede and profession; whereas solitary truth cannot any where finde so ready entertainement; but the same Novelty which is esteemed the commendation of errour and makes that acceptable, is counted the fault 3B2 of truth, and causes that to bee rejected. How did the incredulous World gaze at Columbus when hee promised to discover another part of the earth, and he could not for a long time by his confidence, or arguments, induce any of the Christian Princes, either to assent unto his opinion, or goe to the charges of an experiment. Now if he who had such good grounds for his assertion, could finde no better entertainement among the wiser sort, and upper end of the World; ’tis not likely then that this opinion which I now deliver, shall receive any thing from the men of these daies, especially our vulgar wits, but misbeliefe or derision. It hath alwaies beene the unhappinesse of new truths in Philosophy, to be derided by those that are ignorant of the causes of things, and reiected by others whose perversenesse ties them to the contrary 4 opinion, men whose envious pride will not allow any new thing for truth which they themselves were not the first inventors of. So that I may iustly expect to be accused of a pragmaticall ignorance, and bold ostentation, especially since for this opinion Xenophanes, a man whose authority was able to adde some credit to his assertion could not escape the like censure from others. For Natales Comes speaking of that Philosopher, Mytholog. lib. 3. c. 17. and this his opinion, saith thus, Nonnulli ne nihil scisse videantur, aliqua nova monstra in Philosophiã introducunt, ut alicujus rei inventores fuisse appareant.

Some there are who least they might seeme to know nothing, will bring up monstrous absurdities in Philosophy, that so afterward they may bee famed for the invention of somewhat.

The same author doth also in another place accuse Anaxagoras Lib. 7. c. 1.5B3 of folly for the same opinion, Est enim non ignobilis gradus stultitiæ, vel si nescias quid dicas, tamen velle de rebus propositis hanc vel illam partem stabilire. “’Tis none of the worst kindes of folly, boldly to affirme one side or other, when a man knows not what to say.”

If these men were thus censur’d, I may iustly then expect to be derided by most, and to be believed by few or none; especially since this opinion seemes to carry in it so much strangenesse, so much contradiction to the generall consent of others. But how ever, I am resolved that this shall not be any discouragement, since I know that it is not the common opinion of others that can either adde or detract from the truth. For,

1. Other truths have beene formerly esteemed altogether as ridiculous as this can be.

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